The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Chapter 12: The Road to Munich Summary

Book Three: The Road to War

• Alright, Shmoopers: it's time to strap yourselves in for the longest chapter of the book.
• In this chapter, Shirer offers a blow-by-blow account of Hitler's drawn-out invasion of Czechoslovakia.
• He begins by explaining the main routes that Hitler could take if he wanted to justify an invasion of Czechoslovakia, and notes that Hitler's preference, in the beginning, was to engineer a political assassination that would justify retribution by Germany.
• He then offers a brief history of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, and gives particular attention to the approximately 250,000 Sudeten Germans who represented one of Czechoslovakia's many minority populations.
• After Germany's annexation of Austria, a Czechoslovakian Nazi named Konrad Henlein went to Berlin to meet with Hitler.
• In Berlin, Henlein was instructed to stir up trouble in Czechoslovakia by making demands of the Czech government—specifically, demands which the government would be totally unable to satisfy.
• In this way, Hitler intended to drum up justification and sympathy for the military aggression he intended to carry out. By making it seem as though he'd been provoked by the plight of his fellow Germans, he'd have a convenient excuse to invade Czechoslovakia.

The First Crisis: May 1938 

• When some of Hitler's provisional plans for attack in Czechoslovakia were leaked, Czechoslovakia began to get ready for war; Britain, France and Russia reaffirmed their alliance in case Germany decided to invade anywhere else.
• This period was called the "May Crisis."
• Shirer offers an account of the German military plans that were being developed for "Case Green," which was the code name of the planned attack on Czechoslovakia.
• He draws special attention to the Nazis' plans for a propaganda war and economic warfare, and notes that this was the Nazi M.O. for much of the war until the world woke up and realized what Hitler was doing.
• Although the British government warned Hitler of the gravity of the situation, it never stated explicitly that German aggression in Czechoslovakia would be met with British Arms.
• Shirer shares his personal view that if Chamberlain had told Hitler that the British would respond with military action to the invasion, Hitler might have thought twice about it.
• World War II might have been avoided. Oh, well.
• The Germans informed the Czechs that they actually had no intentions of invading, that the reports German troops on the Czech border were totally false.
• The European governments breathed a sigh of relief.
• Meanwhile, Hitler moped about it.
• On May 28, 1938, Hitler went to Berlin, called the officers of the Wehrmacht to the Chancellery, and announced that Germany would invade Czechoslovakia within six months.

Wavering of the Generals

• Because a number of the generals believed that Germany still wasn't ready to defend itself against the Western powers, tensions were brewing yet again.
• General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the Army General Staff, spent a good chunk of the summer of 1938 trying to convince his fellow officers to oppose the Fuehrer's plans.
• Shirer describes the ins and outs of the Army's reluctant preparations over the summer, and notes that General Beck finally chose to resign from his position in August 1938.
• He brings the section to a close by introducing General Franz Halder, who not only became Hitler's new Chief of the Army General Staff, but also became the major player in the first serious plot to overthrow Hitler.

Birth of a Conspiracy Against Hitler

• The only group really equipped to overthrow Hitler was the army.
• Among the leading lights of the anti-Nazi conspirators was General Ludwig Beck, who soon became a person that both the generals and the civilian resistance could rally around.
• The plan was to take Hitler into custody as soon as he gave the order to invade Czechoslovakia. They'd haul him into court claiming that anyone who was about the lead Germany into a war in Europe wasn't competent to govern.
• Shirer thinks that while General Beck was sure that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would plunge Germany into an all-out war with France and Britain, and possibly Russia, Hitler felt sure that they wouldn't intervene.
• Hitler was right this time.
• The German Army generals were still worried about their chances if Britain and France decided to intervene on behalf of Czechoslovakia, and their concerns were irking Hitler.
• Meanwhile, the anti-Nazi conspirators were putting out feelers in Britain.
• They warned Britain about the plans to invade Czechoslovakia, and said that if Britain would commit to opposing Hitler, they'd promise to do their best to prevent the invasion.
• Although Winston Churchill was willing to issue a firm statement that Britain would go to war if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, Prime Minister Chamberlain was not.
• In September 1938, the Czechoslovakian President, Eduard Beneš (no relation to Elaine Benes), made a public declaration that he'd grant all of the Sudeten German Party's demands.
• This was the last thing the Nazis wanted, since it robbed them of their reason to invade. So, Hitler saw to it that Konrad Henlein broke off negotiations with the Czech government, giving some excuse about about the Czech police.
• Tensions rose in Czechoslovakia, noting that the railroad station was filled with Jews trying to escape to safer parts of Europe.
• In the middle of September 1938, at the annual Nuremberg Party Rally, Hitler delivered a speech that demanded justice for Sudeten Germans.
• The speech provoked a revolt in the Sudetenland, and the Czech government suppressed the revolt and instituted martial law.
• Watching from the sidelines, the French Premier Édouard Daladier asked the British Prime Minister Chamberlain make a bargain with Hitler.
• That very night, Chamberlain sent a message to Hitler, in which he offered to come to Germany to discuss the situation.

Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden: September 15, 1938

• The British public thought that Chamberlain was going to warn Hitler about the dire consequences of invading Czechoslovakia, but Hitler didn't believe that.
• Hitler was pretty sure that Britain and France wouldn't intervene on Czechoslovakia's behalf.
• Unfortunately, he was right again.
• Chamberlain was willing to negotiate the annexation of the Sudetenland in exchange for Hitler taking no action unless he conferred with Chamberlain.
• While Chamberlain returned to England to bring everyone around to his decision to accept the surrender of the Sudetenland, the German Army prepared for war.
• Two of the former generals who were currently plotting against Hitler came out of retirement retirement and were assigned to head armies.
• Meanwhile, the Nazis were encouraging the Hungarians and the Polish to get ready to get in on the action against Czechoslovakia and divide up the spoils.
• The British and French governments continued to discuss what they should do.
• They didn't even bother to consult the Czechs. Instead, they simply presented the threatened nation with terms they drew up together, and which they expected the Czechoslovakian government to accept.
• Not surprisingly, the Czechoslovakian government rejected the terms, stating that giving up the Sudetenland would put them on a slippery slope towards eventual domination by Germany.
• The governments of Britain and France each declared that if Czechoslovakia stood firm, each nation would withdraw from any support to the country.
• Under that kind of pressure, the Czechs were forced to agree to the terms that the British and French had drawn up on their behalf.

Chamberlain at Godesberg: September 22-23

• By late September 1938, Hitler seemed very nervous about the international stew he was cooking up.
• Chamberlain was feeling the pressure, too. Given the concessions that he and Daladier had managed to wring out of the Czechoslovakian President Beneš, he was flabbergasted to discover that their proposals weren't good enough for Hitler.
• In fact, Hitler informed Chamberlain that he was determined to occupy the Sudetenland by October 1.
• Based on Chamberlain's report from the first day of meetings with Hitler, the British and French governments agreed to inform the Czechs that they could no longer tell the Czechs not to mobilize for war.
• At this point, Shirer offers an analysis of Hitler's motivations at this particular point in time. He argues that Hitler had decided not only to destroy Czechoslovakia as a free and independent nation, but also to do so in the most humiliating and aggressive way.
• He then turns back to his discussions of the Godesberg meetings, and notes that on the second day of the meetings, Chamberlain made some new proposals to Hitler.
• In return, Hitler presented the British Prime Minister with a harsh ultimatum.
• In the midst of their tense discussions, the two leaders learned that a general mobilization was underway in Czechoslovakia.
• The news inspired a huge argument between Hitler and Chamberlain, because Hitler was now insisting that the Czechs had made the first aggressive move.
• Eventually, Chamberlain and Hitler both calmed down enough to come to an agreement. Ultimately, the agreement was entirely in Hitler's favor, and when Chamberlain returned to England, he found it impossible to convince the British Parliament to agree to its terms.
• The French Ministers soon arrived in London for further talks, and together the British and the French were informed that the Czechoslovakian government wouldn't accept the Godesberg proposals either.
• The shifting political landscape finally seemed to be turning in Czechoslovakia's favor. For the first time throughout the long negotiations, the French finally confirmed that they'd come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if Hitler attacked.
• The Brits, for their part, reminded Hitler that their treaties with France assured that they'd come to France's aid in any aggression against her.
• But since he really didn't want to take Britain to war, Chamberlain decided to try one more time to change Hitler's mind.
• Chamberlain tried to convince Hitler to continue the negotiations, and Hitler tried to convince Chamberlain that his own position was perfectly reasonable.

The Eleventh Hour

• On September 27, 1938, the British fleet was being mobilized, a state of emergency had been declared, and the Auxiliary Air Force had been called up.
• Chamberlain had also warned President Beneš that a German invasion would be imminent if the Czechs continued to reject Hitler's ultimatum.
• The British Prime Minister also issued a public broadcast that night, and, as Shirer states, "most people in Britain went to bed that night believing that Britain and Germany would be at war within twenty-four hours." (3.12.268)
• Late that night, Chamberlain received word from Hitler that he was willing to continue the negotiations. Chamberlain jumped at the chance to avoid war.
• He quickly responded with yet another offer to come to Hitler—this time with representatives from Czechoslovakia, France, and Italy. The British Prime Minister was deliberately excluding the Soviet Union from the ongoing negotiations.

"Black Wednesday" and the Halder Plot Against Hitler

• Meanwhile, the anti-Nazi conspirators were hatching a plot to overthrow Hitler before his invasion of Czechoslovakia could ignite another world war.
• The conspirators were still working to convince other generals that Hitler's actions really would start a war that Germany couldn't hope to win.
• As they discovered, many German Army officers were reluctant to act because it seemed as though Britain and France wouldn't do anything about an invasion of Czechoslovakia; therefore, no world war.
• The conspirators ran into other obstacles as they tried to decide whether or not to act. Meanwhile, the Western powers were still trying to decide what to do.
• When when the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany finally settled on a place and time to meet, they decided to leave Czechoslovakia's government out of the discussions.
• When the negotiations finally moved forward, the anti-Nazi conspirators called off their plans for a coup. Some of them even blamed the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain for "saving" Hitler at the last minute.
• Shirer argues that the real problem was the conspirators' lack of committed leadership.

The Surrender at Munich: September 29-30, 1938

• Before Hitler and his Nazi henchmen sat down with the representatives from Britain and France, Hitler met privately with Mussolini to try to forge an alliance.
• English and French representatives didn't bother to do the same, and Shirer argues that it seemed as if Chamberlain didn't want anyone to stand in the way of his agreement with Hitler.
• Shirer now describes the talks themselves as just a formality—they gave Hitler everything he wanted.
• Although Hitler wouldn't allow any Czech representatives to sit in one the meeting itself, two waited in the adjoining room.
• That night, after Germany, Italy, England, and France had reached a deal among themselves, they announced the terms of their agreement to the Czechs.
• Prime Minister Chamberlain visited Hitler once more before he left Munich, and he convinced the Nazi Fuehrer to sign a brief which announced the British and German governments' mutual desire that their two peoples would never go to war with one another again.
• Shirer describes Chamberlain's triumphant return to London, where he was greeted as a conquering hero. The mood in Prague was a little different.
• In short order, President, Eduard Beneš was forced to resign, the Polish and Hungarian governments stepped in to claim Czechoslovakian territories for themselves, and the country was forced by Berlin to install a pro-German fascist-leaning government.
• Czechoslovakia was now at Hitler's mercy.

The Consequences of Munich

• Although the German people could see perfectly well that Hitler had made stunning victory, the governments of Britain and France didn't seem to understand the long-term effects of what they'd just done.
• Only Winston Churchill seemed to get it, and nobody paid any attention to him.
• Shirer believes that if England and France had stood their ground, they could've quickly and easily defeated the German Army had a war broken out then and there.
• He admits that he can't be sure just how much Britain and France actually knew about the relative weakness of the German Army at that time, but he does feel sure about one thing: The Munich Agreement didn't help the Western powers at all. All it did was give the Nazis even more time to strengthen their position.
• Shirer reiterates that the Munich Agreement was a disaster for everyone but Hitler.
• (You know, just in case we hadn't figured that out by now.)
• Still, in spite of Hitler's victory in negotiating the surrender of Czechoslovakia and humiliating the Western powers, he was still miffed that he didn't get the opportunity to take Czechoslovakia by force.